Metroliner
Sunday, December 9, 2012
Senior Seminar Recap
I enrolled at EMU to obtain my degree for personal and professional reasons. I have been working in the industry for 16 years, starting as a part time bag thrower and working my way up to Hub Duty Manager. The next two steps are Department Manager and HUB Director. There are also a range of support management positions that augment the operation. My degree allows me to achieve the next steps.
My plan has not changed. I am nine years from obtaining lifetime flight benefits. As long as I am able to grow with my employer, I will stay to earn those benefits. The program and this course have given me options on where I can take my career. I have learned that maintaining options, through education and networking, are vital to thriving in this industry. Paths I would consider if my plan changes include, airport and corporate flying management.
The most interesting blog topic was on commercial flights and the should flying be a luxury. I strongly believe that our country needs a new master plan for air and ground transportation. There needs to be a strong regional ground network that supports a regional airport. Our current transportation system is over reliant on short haul flying and rental cars. This is too expensive for the user and the environment.
I found the least interesting blog topic on NextGen. Much of this is because I choose it for a paper topic and then it kept popping up in other classes. NextGen is a large project and it will affect each of us. However, the project milestones are far apart and the topic gets repetitive when there is nothing new to discuss.
The guest speaker that I found most interesting was Theresa Whiting from Solo Aviation. Her personal story and career path were interesting and motivating. Her presentation style was energetic and she conveyed the success of a non traditional career path.
After four consecutive semesters of full time work and school, I will be taking a break. I only made it out of the country once last year and need to make up for some lost travel time. In all honesty, I will start my MBA in the beginning of 2014. Even if it one class, each semester, it is important for me to continue my education.
I have thoroughly enjoyed this class. The blogging and guest speakers should be incorporated into all of the core aviation courses.
Sunday, December 2, 2012
Paying The Environmental Cost of Flying?
The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) is
designed to create financial incentives to reduce the carbon emissions from
aircraft. The system, as proposed, calculates
these emissions from the engine start up in the originating city until the
aircraft lands in the EU. It works the
same way for the flight back.
The United States and most countries outside of the EU feel
that the EU-ETS is an overreach of the EU powers. The US acknowledges the EU’s right to
regulate its own airspace but not sovereign airspace outside of the EU.
The EU has been working on a solution to aircraft carbon
emissions since 1997. This was when it
was proposed at International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO has announced that it supports
market-based reforms but has not agreed on a plan to implement these
reforms. ICAO is essentiality the United
Nations of the aviation world and is slow moving when it comes to major
change. The EU’s overreaching ETS shows
that it is tired of waiting on ICAO.
The EU has temporarily deferred the EU-ETS on operators
outside of the EU. This is for one year,
until the 2013 ICAO
General Assembly meets. The EU said
they would reinstate
their ETS if ICAO fails to act. ICAO
needs to move forward on a global solution.
If a global solution cannot be reached, they need the EU to back off the
carbon calculations outside of their airspace.
Ultimately, a global ETS needs to be established that creates a market/incentive
to reduce pollution.
Emission trading systems or Cap and Trade programs have been
around since the 1980’s. The best
example is with our current wetland laws.
In the US, you cannot destroy a wetland without remediation. You can do this by creating a new wetland in
another location. You can also buy
wetland credits from someone who has built a wetland. This is expensive and cost-prohibitive. This cost creates a barrier that keeps
wetlands from being destroyed. Before
the DTW McNamara terminal was built, Wayne County had to fill in acres of
wetland. To do this, they agreed to
build Crosswinds
Marsh. Wayne County overbuilt this
site in order to gain wetland credits.
These credits were sold to developers to recover construction costs and
some were used to cover other Wayne County projects.
These types of programs are designed to create a reward
system for reducing pollution. Pollution
taxes, permitting and fines can only go so far in preventing pollution. I feel that Cap and Trade programs are an
important next step in environmental policy.
There purpose should only be to promote technologies that reduce
pollution and reward companies that invest in these technologies. My biggest problem with the EU-ETS is the
regulation of non-sovereign airspace and the unknown use of the government
collected fines/taxes.
Another reason that I support an aviation ETS is that there
is an environmental cost to flying an aircraft.
Thousands of pounds of fuel do not vanish when they burn in an
engine. They contribute to our overall
problem of too much carbon and other chemicals in the atmosphere. ETS/Cap and Trade programs begin to identify
and address this cost.
Sunday, November 11, 2012
NextGen
NextGen is the 20+ billion dollar project focused on upgrading the ATC system from a ground based system to one controlled with satellites and digital technology. It is a rebuild of the current system from the foundation up. In this project we have to live in the house while it is being rebuilt. This makes it complicated and expensive. NextGen, when complete, will have four major impacts. They are safety, flexibility, sustainability and economic.
Outside of being the first and foremost responsibility in our industry, NextGen brings tangible safety improvements to the NAS. A major NextGen part, Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Boardcast (ADS-B) will give controllers and pilots real time positioning information of each aircraft. Pilots will not have to solely rely on finding dots through the windscreen to identify traffic.
Flexibility was not a big consideration when the FAA was hard wiring computers into their facilities. Technology will continue to advance and NextGen will be adaptable to these changes. This will prevent us from painting ourselves into another corner with outdated technology.
Sustainability will be enhanced with the NextGen project. NextGen will allow for a more direct routing of aircraft and decrease the amount of space between aircraft. This results in less fuel being consumed to accommodate the current system. Less fuel burn is good for the environment and for the aircraft operator.
Economic benefits will be realized in less fuel burn with NextGen. This benefit will be slow to realize while the NextGen investment is being paid off. An additional economic benefit to the operators will be the increase in capacity in the system. For example, NextGen has the ability to untangle the ATC mess around NYC. Solving this problem will give the airlines the ability to add service to and through this and other populated areas. This will result in more revenue for the operators.
The sooner the NextGen investment is paid off, the faster the economic benefits can be realized. My initial thought is that this project should be fully funded through the Federal government. Outside of that option, I think that user fees are an insufficient funding source for NextGen and not legitimate unless they are rescinded once the initial NextGen investment is paid off. In reality, paying for NextGen will require a number of sources, including some type of user fee/tax. One source the FAA is deploying is loan guarantees. The 2012 FAA funding re-authorization allows the FAA to back loans taken out for NextGen equipage. More information can be found at equipage incentives.
I think the NAS capacity improvements will have the biggest effect on my career. As operators fill the capacity vacuum we will have more airplanes to manage which leads to more jobs. A side benefit will be the additional data that NextGen will provide. The data will allow for better business decisions. We will move from a place of estimated arrival and departure times to actual times. The improvements in weather forecasting and its effects on the operation will lead to better schedules are more efficient planning.
The benefits of NextGen will be slow as the project is expected to take at least 10 years. I think we should have a tempered optimism for NextGen. The benefits will be great but this is a complex project with much of the technology being invented as this project progresses.
Outside of being the first and foremost responsibility in our industry, NextGen brings tangible safety improvements to the NAS. A major NextGen part, Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Boardcast (ADS-B) will give controllers and pilots real time positioning information of each aircraft. Pilots will not have to solely rely on finding dots through the windscreen to identify traffic.
Flexibility was not a big consideration when the FAA was hard wiring computers into their facilities. Technology will continue to advance and NextGen will be adaptable to these changes. This will prevent us from painting ourselves into another corner with outdated technology.
Sustainability will be enhanced with the NextGen project. NextGen will allow for a more direct routing of aircraft and decrease the amount of space between aircraft. This results in less fuel being consumed to accommodate the current system. Less fuel burn is good for the environment and for the aircraft operator.
Economic benefits will be realized in less fuel burn with NextGen. This benefit will be slow to realize while the NextGen investment is being paid off. An additional economic benefit to the operators will be the increase in capacity in the system. For example, NextGen has the ability to untangle the ATC mess around NYC. Solving this problem will give the airlines the ability to add service to and through this and other populated areas. This will result in more revenue for the operators.
The sooner the NextGen investment is paid off, the faster the economic benefits can be realized. My initial thought is that this project should be fully funded through the Federal government. Outside of that option, I think that user fees are an insufficient funding source for NextGen and not legitimate unless they are rescinded once the initial NextGen investment is paid off. In reality, paying for NextGen will require a number of sources, including some type of user fee/tax. One source the FAA is deploying is loan guarantees. The 2012 FAA funding re-authorization allows the FAA to back loans taken out for NextGen equipage. More information can be found at equipage incentives.
I think the NAS capacity improvements will have the biggest effect on my career. As operators fill the capacity vacuum we will have more airplanes to manage which leads to more jobs. A side benefit will be the additional data that NextGen will provide. The data will allow for better business decisions. We will move from a place of estimated arrival and departure times to actual times. The improvements in weather forecasting and its effects on the operation will lead to better schedules are more efficient planning.
The benefits of NextGen will be slow as the project is expected to take at least 10 years. I think we should have a tempered optimism for NextGen. The benefits will be great but this is a complex project with much of the technology being invented as this project progresses.
Sunday, November 4, 2012
What's a birthday? Pilot Mandatory Retirement Age
In 1959, the pilot mandatory retirement age was set at 60
years old. The reason for the rule was
to ensure safety. The age limit was changed in 2007 to 65 for the
same reasons. The consensus was that
once you hit your 65th birthday you were automatically unsafe to
fly. Is there a correlation between
birthdays and safety?
A pilot’s retirement age should not be set in stone. With over a century of human factors research
along with safety management systems and cognitive testing, a pilot’s
retirement date should be based on ability and not age. The reason this is important is that we have
a shortage of pilots that cannot be filled solely with new recruits. Additionally, airlines lose valuable talent
when a pilot retires. Why not integrate
these pilots into training or mentoring.
Another issue is that new major carrier
pilots are much older than ever. This is
in part to the swollen regional carrier ranks and a lack of the majors hiring
over the last decade. These pilots will
need to serve longer in order to secure a decent retirement. Benefits
of hiring older workers.
My prediction is that the market will force the major
carriers hand in this issue. A lack of
pilots will increase the value of the retiring pilot. I could see the medicals adding more cognitive
testing after age 60. The performance
rate of the test could dictate the hours the pilot could fly. I also see fuller schedules for full-time
pilots with the addition of part-time (60+) pilots.
I think that pilots have value that is not being recognized
because of the mandatory retirement age.
I am a management student so this does not have a direct bearing on my
career path. However, older employee
enhance any company or workplace. As a
manager, I would like to find a way to integrate these pilots into continuing with
the workforce.
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Ground Game
In the unlikely scenario of being in our aviation program
and never having flown commercially, you might question what happens inside the
airport or inside the airplane. How to
airplanes know where to park? How do
passengers get to the airplane? What
happens on the other side of the cockpit door?
This scenario is exaggerated but it sheds light on the fact that working
in this industry is more than taking off and landing into the wind. I am not discounting the program; just
introducing this blog post about ground operations, its history, and my
prediction for its future.
Ever since the Montgolfier brothers got their paper balloon
off the ground in 1783, someone was on the ground facilitating manned
flight. As history progressed whether it
was spinning props, loading mail, or putting out fires, ground operations
employees are needed to make flight operations successful. Today’s ground operations employees are
essential to safely and efficiently receiving and dispatching(pushing out) each
aircraft. These employees work above
wing to facilitate passenger handling and below wing to service the aircraft make
possible the safe loading of bags and freight.
Ground operations employees make up the largest group of employees for
most airlines. At United,
close to 30% of their 87,000 employees work directly in ground operations.
Generally, ground operations employees are hired from
outside the industry and trained in-house.
The level of training is focused on their direct job duties and
compliance with the regulations. One
area of training that is important for pilots is the Ground Security
Coordinator (GSC). 49 U.S.C § 1544
requires that most schedule and charter operators have a GSC. The GSC acts as a liaison with between the
airline and outside agencies and works directly with the flight crew on any
security matters.
The future of ground operations is about providing the
service at the lowest costs. Air
carriers are continuing to push the envelope of outsourcing the below wing,
ramp services. The next downturn in the
industry could see a large air carrier with its entire ramp service contracted
out. Contract employees are paid at a
much lower rate with little or no benefits.
Passenger service jobs are also being contracted out but the greatest threat is automation. Check-in kiosks have greatly reduced queues
at ticket counter. Airline apps
allow passengers to rebook flights directly from their phone. Delta is even testing automated
boarding gates that will eliminate any need to interact with any ground
operations employee.
Ground operations is still a large source of jobs especially
for managers. These jobs are in demand
and are a great way to “get your foot in the door”. In addition to knowing more about job
opportunities, ground operations are essential to any flight. It is important that the flight and
management student know more about ground operations and how it will affect
their work environment.
Sunday, October 21, 2012
GA: Doing Business In China
The U.S. general aviation aircraft industry is
knocking on China's door. In March of this year, Cessna signed a joint
venture agreement with Aviation Industry of China (AVIC). The
agreement paves the way for Cessna aircraft to be manufactured and assembled in China.
Cessna announced in May that the Cessna Caravan will be the first
aircraft marketed through this agreement. The Caravans will be
manufactured in Kansas and then assembled at AVIC's facilities in Shijiazhuang.
Shijiazhuang is approximately 200 miles southwest of Beijing.
The GA industry wants into
China. According to the U.S.
Consulate General Shanghai, consumer aviation has been growing at a
rate of 21% since 1996 on construction and public service needs. This
does not include personal and corporate travel. This growth is posed to
explode given that China's transportation infrastructure is mainly rail, followed by commercial air service.
The GA
industry cannot easily sell their aircraft in China. The Chinese government levies high import
duties on these aircraft. The duties can
be avoided if the aircraft are manufactured or assembled in China. The barrier here is that the industry cannot organize
alone in China. The Chinese government
requires that foreign corporations partner with a corporation owned by Chinese
stockholders or government agency. The
Chinese government caps the foreign investment to maintain Chinese control of
the venture. The demand for the Chinese market is so great that many foreign corporations are willing to take the risk to gain the reward.
As with
any industry growth, people are needed to drive that growth. The U.S. Consulate report states that pilot
training in China is more expensive than in the U.S. This is based on the limited infrastructure
for flying and training. According to Bloomberg,
the Chinese airliners are already recruiting here.
This type of recruiting will increase as new G.A. flying increases
within China. There will also be a tremendous
need for factory and product support both in the U.S. and China to support this
growth.
Sunday, October 7, 2012
Regional Industry - Flying in the clouds
Comair's story is not just a sleepy corporate history but the story of the entire regional industry. The 1970's was a fertile time for our present regional carriers. SkyWest was founded in 1972, Chautauqua in 1973, Mesaba in 1974, and Comair in 1977. Each of these carriers started in a small airport providing service to a large city, all except Comair. Comair was founded in Cincinnati, OH - CVG. At CVG, Comair provided the Cincinnati business community service to smaller cities. They used this location to build a strong feeder network into CVG. When Delta opened a northern hub in the early eighty's Comair was a natural selection to become a Delta Connection Carrier.
Comair like its counterparts flew a variety of aircraft. They started with two Piper Navajo aircraft followed by aircraft such as the Fairchild Metroliner, Embraer Bandeirante, Embraer Brasilia, and SAAB-340. That all changed in 1993 when Comair took the"big bet" and became the first US operator of the CRJ. In this bet, Comair leveraged their company and financed the first order. Basically overnight, Comair with the CRJ changed the industry. The aircraft was a huge hit with the traveler. A seat in a sleek corporate jet for the same price as the "puddle jumper" along with the quiet cabin and increased speed was an answer to the business travelers prayers. The "safety" of jet engines compared to props was a hit was the leisure traveler. The bet paid off for Comair, in-part because of their agreement with Delta. Up until this point, the mainline carrier only provided marketing and reservation services to the regional through code share agreements while the regional carried the financial risk for the flight. Once the marketing fee was paid and the flight expenses (fuel $15/barrel) covered, the rest was pure profit. Comair used their significant profits to secure additional CRJ delivery slots and pay their shareholders.
The mid to late 1990's were boom times for the economy and the regionals. Carriers could not snap up the new CRJ's and later ERJ's fast enough. The mainline carriers, seeing the profits, weighed in and started ordering and financing even larger orders. Northwest, being more practical than innovative, was left purchasing thirty-six old-school AVRO RJ-85's while they waited eagerly for their CRJ delivery slots.
The mainline carrier control of the CRJ/ERJ fleets and the creation of "capacity-plus" agreements were the end to the regional airline money making machine. A capacity plus agreement is where the mainline carrier pays the regional a set rate for each departure. The set rate covers the flight expense, normally excluding fuel, and includes a slim profit margin. With the model, the leaner the regional operates the more money it makes. Most carriers complied with this arrangement because the mainline carrier either owned or financed their fleet. Comair was the exception. Comair's early start meant that it owned its fleet and was quite happy with the Delta marketing arrangement. Delta had no way to cover Comair's capacity so in 1999, at the height of the RJ bubble, Delta paid $2 billion for the 80% of Comair it didn't already own.
Comair's story is far from over. Comair's pilots thought they struck gold when they became a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta. Comair's $2 billion dollar price tag and a history of Comair profits increased expectations for the pilots. Additionally, talks of guaranteed flow through, aircraft painted in a Delta livery, similar uniforms and other perks led the pilots to believe they were Delta. Soon after the purchase, the Comair pilots started contract negotiations with demands for the Delta pay and benefits. The negotiations dragged on between the pilots and Comair management. Finally in the summer of 2001, the Comair pilots went on strike. The strike went on for three months. Comair almost exclusively carried all of the Delta regional traffic in Cincinnati, New York and Orlando while ASA fed Atlanta and SkyWest fed Salt Lake City. For three months, Delta's regional feed in the Comair hubs was silent. ASA would not fly struck work and non-union SkyWest was not organized or large enough to mobilize. Also, covering Comair from other hubs would spread the damage.
Comair and it's pilots finally settled in the Fall of 2001. The purchase, strike, and capacity-plus agreements ended Comair's heyday. All of the mainline carriers began to homogenize their regional feed in terms of route map and product. The mainline carriers, suffering turbulence of their own, slowed and even stopped hiring. This, in addition to hard fought for above average wages, kept Comair pilots from progressing to the mainline carriers. This, in turn, made Comair more senior and more and more expensive. Delta and Comair filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Delta placed Comair up for sale. Comair reorganized as a smaller company and Delta continued to market it to other regionals. Cutting their losses, Delta continued to shrink Comair. As Comair got smaller, it became more expensive as the remaining senior pilots dominated the seniority list. Finally, this Summer Delta finally announced it was closing Comair.
Capacity-plus agreements have placed the regionals on a very short leash. Until the mainline carriers start to wholesale hire, the regional carrier's seniority list will stay stubbornly senior and expensive. These expensive seniority lists only allow the regional carriers barely break even. Examples of this include Mesa which after reorganization is a shell of its former self. Colgan and Mesaba shut down with Pinnacle in bankruptcy. Pinnacle almost had their contract negotiations completed when Delta vetoed and ordered management back to the table for more concessions. American Eagle is in bankruptcy. Republic is making some money by flying every type of aircraft for anyone that asks. SkyWest is doing the best right now due to its size. They are able to spread their costs out over a lot of flying under SkyWest and ExpressJet/ASA capacity-plus agreements and SkyWest at risk/EAS flying.
Mainline hiring will give the regionals relief to their heavy seniority lists. The CRJ-100/200 that revolutionized the industry is now its crux with fuel remaining stubbornly over $100/barrel. Where Comair was making big money at $15/barrel, the industry is crippled at $100/barrel. Delta is in the process of shedding 220 CRJ-200's in favor of larger RJ's and mainline aircraft. This should motivate Delta to hire. If the other mainline carrier follow, this hiring will create new opportunities at mainline and regional carriers.
However, to fix the regional industry, it needs a new aircraft. A result of the aircraft "upguaging" will be the reduction of flight schedules to maintain fares. Also, smaller markets continue to be cut as they are uneconomical with larger aircraft. Most CRJ-200 markets are less than 750 miles and many are less than 500 miles from a hub. Turboprops are more efficient than jets on these segments. While a turboprop is more efficient, I feel it needs to be a new design and not a rehashed Dash-8 or ATR. A new prop would give the regionals a new tool to serve shorter, thinner routes for mainline carriers and an affordable vehicle for at-risk, money making flying, into other markets. Prop bias should be less of an issue since the question will be 'no service' or 'prop service'.
I looked at a number of regional carrier's job boards. All were hiring front line flight ops, tech ops, and ground ops positions with few management position. Air Wisconsin had three city manager positions, training instructors and a VP position available.
I feel that the airline industry is building momentum for another growth stage. The remaining bankruptcies and mergers will mature in 2013-14 and this will set the stage. As the economy continues to improve and airlines need to hire, more opportunities will be available to those qualified to take them.
Comair like its counterparts flew a variety of aircraft. They started with two Piper Navajo aircraft followed by aircraft such as the Fairchild Metroliner, Embraer Bandeirante, Embraer Brasilia, and SAAB-340. That all changed in 1993 when Comair took the"big bet" and became the first US operator of the CRJ. In this bet, Comair leveraged their company and financed the first order. Basically overnight, Comair with the CRJ changed the industry. The aircraft was a huge hit with the traveler. A seat in a sleek corporate jet for the same price as the "puddle jumper" along with the quiet cabin and increased speed was an answer to the business travelers prayers. The "safety" of jet engines compared to props was a hit was the leisure traveler. The bet paid off for Comair, in-part because of their agreement with Delta. Up until this point, the mainline carrier only provided marketing and reservation services to the regional through code share agreements while the regional carried the financial risk for the flight. Once the marketing fee was paid and the flight expenses (fuel $15/barrel) covered, the rest was pure profit. Comair used their significant profits to secure additional CRJ delivery slots and pay their shareholders.
The mid to late 1990's were boom times for the economy and the regionals. Carriers could not snap up the new CRJ's and later ERJ's fast enough. The mainline carriers, seeing the profits, weighed in and started ordering and financing even larger orders. Northwest, being more practical than innovative, was left purchasing thirty-six old-school AVRO RJ-85's while they waited eagerly for their CRJ delivery slots.
The mainline carrier control of the CRJ/ERJ fleets and the creation of "capacity-plus" agreements were the end to the regional airline money making machine. A capacity plus agreement is where the mainline carrier pays the regional a set rate for each departure. The set rate covers the flight expense, normally excluding fuel, and includes a slim profit margin. With the model, the leaner the regional operates the more money it makes. Most carriers complied with this arrangement because the mainline carrier either owned or financed their fleet. Comair was the exception. Comair's early start meant that it owned its fleet and was quite happy with the Delta marketing arrangement. Delta had no way to cover Comair's capacity so in 1999, at the height of the RJ bubble, Delta paid $2 billion for the 80% of Comair it didn't already own.
Comair's story is far from over. Comair's pilots thought they struck gold when they became a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta. Comair's $2 billion dollar price tag and a history of Comair profits increased expectations for the pilots. Additionally, talks of guaranteed flow through, aircraft painted in a Delta livery, similar uniforms and other perks led the pilots to believe they were Delta. Soon after the purchase, the Comair pilots started contract negotiations with demands for the Delta pay and benefits. The negotiations dragged on between the pilots and Comair management. Finally in the summer of 2001, the Comair pilots went on strike. The strike went on for three months. Comair almost exclusively carried all of the Delta regional traffic in Cincinnati, New York and Orlando while ASA fed Atlanta and SkyWest fed Salt Lake City. For three months, Delta's regional feed in the Comair hubs was silent. ASA would not fly struck work and non-union SkyWest was not organized or large enough to mobilize. Also, covering Comair from other hubs would spread the damage.
Comair and it's pilots finally settled in the Fall of 2001. The purchase, strike, and capacity-plus agreements ended Comair's heyday. All of the mainline carriers began to homogenize their regional feed in terms of route map and product. The mainline carriers, suffering turbulence of their own, slowed and even stopped hiring. This, in addition to hard fought for above average wages, kept Comair pilots from progressing to the mainline carriers. This, in turn, made Comair more senior and more and more expensive. Delta and Comair filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Delta placed Comair up for sale. Comair reorganized as a smaller company and Delta continued to market it to other regionals. Cutting their losses, Delta continued to shrink Comair. As Comair got smaller, it became more expensive as the remaining senior pilots dominated the seniority list. Finally, this Summer Delta finally announced it was closing Comair.
Capacity-plus agreements have placed the regionals on a very short leash. Until the mainline carriers start to wholesale hire, the regional carrier's seniority list will stay stubbornly senior and expensive. These expensive seniority lists only allow the regional carriers barely break even. Examples of this include Mesa which after reorganization is a shell of its former self. Colgan and Mesaba shut down with Pinnacle in bankruptcy. Pinnacle almost had their contract negotiations completed when Delta vetoed and ordered management back to the table for more concessions. American Eagle is in bankruptcy. Republic is making some money by flying every type of aircraft for anyone that asks. SkyWest is doing the best right now due to its size. They are able to spread their costs out over a lot of flying under SkyWest and ExpressJet/ASA capacity-plus agreements and SkyWest at risk/EAS flying.
Mainline hiring will give the regionals relief to their heavy seniority lists. The CRJ-100/200 that revolutionized the industry is now its crux with fuel remaining stubbornly over $100/barrel. Where Comair was making big money at $15/barrel, the industry is crippled at $100/barrel. Delta is in the process of shedding 220 CRJ-200's in favor of larger RJ's and mainline aircraft. This should motivate Delta to hire. If the other mainline carrier follow, this hiring will create new opportunities at mainline and regional carriers.
However, to fix the regional industry, it needs a new aircraft. A result of the aircraft "upguaging" will be the reduction of flight schedules to maintain fares. Also, smaller markets continue to be cut as they are uneconomical with larger aircraft. Most CRJ-200 markets are less than 750 miles and many are less than 500 miles from a hub. Turboprops are more efficient than jets on these segments. While a turboprop is more efficient, I feel it needs to be a new design and not a rehashed Dash-8 or ATR. A new prop would give the regionals a new tool to serve shorter, thinner routes for mainline carriers and an affordable vehicle for at-risk, money making flying, into other markets. Prop bias should be less of an issue since the question will be 'no service' or 'prop service'.
I looked at a number of regional carrier's job boards. All were hiring front line flight ops, tech ops, and ground ops positions with few management position. Air Wisconsin had three city manager positions, training instructors and a VP position available.
I feel that the airline industry is building momentum for another growth stage. The remaining bankruptcies and mergers will mature in 2013-14 and this will set the stage. As the economy continues to improve and airlines need to hire, more opportunities will be available to those qualified to take them.
Monday, October 1, 2012
Farewell Comair
Waiting to board one of Comair's final flights.
I remember when Comair was revered. They took the big gamble on the first CRJ's. Their success created a new model that transformed the industry. The regionals were making serious money and they could not get CRJ's fast enough. The high point came when Delta spent $2 billion to buy out Comair.
Big money was being flashed around at Comair and the pilots wanted their share. They shut down Comair in the summer of 2001 in an attempt to get THE industry leading contract. They ended up with the contract but significant damage was done to the company and union. The majors started mixing the feed at their hubs and playing the regionals against one another which started the race to the bottom. Comair's expensive pilot contract was a millstone around their neck and the pilots refused to budge. Comair's bankruptcy was not successful enough to bring down their costs. Delta tried to sell Comair without success. In the end, Delta broke down Comair and finally shut it down.
I don't want to place blame solely on the pilots. It was the contact and the pilot's seniority that made Comair so expensive. The regional model only works if the major carriers keep hiring the senior regional pilots. This keeps the average pilot pay low enough to be competitive. The major's failed to keep up their end of the deal and punished the regional whose seniority made them too expensive.
Comair will always be remembered for their success and contribution to the industry. They are also a lesson on the pitfalls of excess that accompanies the boom and bust cycle of this business.
In the end, Comair was more than just contracts and seniority lists. It was made of some of the best people in this business. I hope they find smooth landings.
Sunday, September 30, 2012
Flying: Is it the only way to go?
Last Friday, I took the
opportunity to pay my respects to Comair by flying on their final round trip to
GRR on their last day of service. During
my :26 minute flight, one of nine scheduled that day between DTW and GRR, I began
working on this blog. Is it realistic to
run nine aircraft a day between these two cities? I then looked at Chicago and Detroit. There are 35 daily flights between the two
cities. A two-week advance round trip
ticket runs a total of $181. After
taxes, just over $100 goes to the airline.
It is safe to say that at $50 each way, this route is not a major moneymaker
for the competitors; American, Delta, Southwest, and United. The route only makes sense when you consider
that each competitor has a major hub at either end where they can sell DTW-ORD at
a loss if they make enough money on the connecting flight. It does not hurt that Detroit and Chicago are
both major cities. Also, the 4 hour
drive takes closer to 6 with traffic and the scheduled train service is
anything but convenient.
Is nine flights a day between DTW
and GRR too many? How about 35 a day
between DTW and ORD/MDW? Prior to 1978,
the U.S. government answered those questions.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) determined the number of flights
allowed, at what times and price. They
decided what aircraft flew the route and at what level of service. Airline competition consisted of buying the
best aircraft and having the best lobbyists in Washington D.C. The deregulation act of 1978 ended this by
opening the gates and forcing the carriers in to the arena to fight it out. Free of CAB control and subsidies, they
slashed fares to fill the aircraft. The
fare sales caused entire aircraft to sell out at the sale price causing a
losing situation. The solution was yield
management. Yield management is basically
the setting of ticket prices.
Essentially, the air carriers set a price based on historical data. Supply and demand then determine the price
you pay. If the seats are not selling, the
fare goes down. As the airplane fills
up, the price goes up. This is why last
minute tickets are so expensive. The
airlines have this down to an exact science.
Deregulation and yield management
are the reasons there are nine flights a day to GRR and 35 a day to ORD/MDW. The carriers have pumped so many seats onto
the route because they are feeding their hubs and yield management ensures that
every passenger doesn’t pay $50 each way.
Deregulation and yield management are also the reasons that carriers
cannot just charge more, or just fly less.
For example, Delta decides that nine flights to GRR are too many and cuts back
to five. Assuming no change in aircraft size, the fewer number of seats
through yield management would increase the ticket prices. The
higher prices at Delta would push passengers to other carriers and they would
travel through their hubs. Wholesale
reduction in flights and higher prices could not happen without the industry
working together. Higher ticket prices
would lead to higher profits, however, any hypothetical industry solidarity
would break down as the temptation for more profits leads the airlines to add
capacity. A government solution has
already demonstrated its failure to manage the market.
Airplanes are not always the most
efficient way to move passengers. Energy
wise trains and buses are more efficient over shorter distances. However, the solution is not re-regulating
the industry. The answer is having a comprehensive
transportation policy that includes planes, trains and automobiles. This week’s Aviation Week has a commentary
about the European carriers losing on regional routes to the high-speed
rail. The carriers are only able to
maintain a limited schedule to feed their international flights. Domestic and some domestic transferring to
international flights go by rail to the major cities. Instead of regulating, the government needs
to invest in regional high speed rail and ground services. Investments in these areas will allow the
market to become more efficient.
A more practical, shorter term
solution is to upguage from 50-seat RJ’s to larger RJ’s and narrow body
aircraft. Why run nine CRJ-200’s between
a market when you could run three 737’s?
Delta
is going to give this a shot. However, the plan comes with risks. What if the other carriers do not
follow? What if oil drops and the
50-seat RJ’s make financial sense. Delta
will be left without the correct fleet mix to compete effectively on schedules and capacity. I feel that as long as oil remains stubbornly
high, the industry and greater transportation industry will have to find
better ways to move passengers more efficiently.
Sunday, September 23, 2012
The Legacy of Colgan 3407
The Colgan flight 3407 families will be remembered for their exceptional hard work and dedication. Most crash families form a support system to handle the tragedy. Their typical result is making the air carrier pay and creating a memorial to the family members, they lost. The response from the 3407 families has far surpassed anything we have seen before. They turned their grief into action and took on the airlines and Washington to make sure the causes for their accident are not repeated. Three years later they are still fighting for passage of the final rules. It is important that when we discuss PL 111-216 / Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, we remember that a tragic accident drove the need for this legislation.
The Airline
Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 directs the FAA to make a number of
changes. These changes include strengthening flight and duty time,
mandating safety management systems and improving flight training in addition to
other safety enhancements. The flight
and duty time rules were finalized in December 2011 and lengthen pilot rest
periods from 8 hours to 10 hours. Other parts of this legislation are awaiting
rule finalization. These parts include crewmember
training and the ATP certificate requirement.
Section 212 of this
legislation covers pilot fatigue. This
ruling will affect my career because it will change the ways crews are
scheduled. During many schedules, the
last crew in takes this first flight out.
The last flight comes in at 10:00pm and the crew heads to the hotel. With the present 8 hour rest, they return for
a 6:30am outbound. By 2014, they will
require a 10 hour rest with 8 hours dedicated to sleep. They will no longer be available for the
6:30am outbound. A second crew will be
required to overnight in order to cover the first outbound. If I am in operations, I will have to manage this
additional scheduling burden. The
benefit to this section is that crew members should be better rested to fly. This will make flying safer because the crew
will be more awake and alert. It will
also drive some quality of life improvements that current regional airline
contracts do not cover. This section
will increase the need for additional pilots. These changes will not be free. Less pilot productivity drives higher expenses
for the air carriers. Regional Costs. Regional carriers
have very tight profit margins and their service agreements are not easily
negotiated. They will need to find a way
to cover these added expenses while still providing their contracted levels of
service.
Section 217 covers ATP
Certification. At a high level, it
requires a minimum of 1,500 total flight hours and an ATP certificate. Flight hour credits can be given for specific
academic training courses. EMU will need
to be ready to meet these requirements in order to remain a viable flight
school. I feel this section is trying to
answer the question: If the flight 3407 pilots had 1500 hours and an ATP before
flying for Colgan would they be better prepared to handle the icing conditions
they encountered? It is impossible to
know for sure. The benefits of this
section include better-qualified pilots, based on hours. This looks good on paper but it has some
significant downsides. The first one is
cost. How does a student pilot pay for
1500 hours in terms of time and money?
The longer training will defiantly slow down the number of available
pilots. This could lead to a pilot shortage
with pilot fatigue rules (section 212), pilot retirements, and regular
attrition are driving the need for pilots.
This legislation is
necessary even through sections 212 and 217 increase the demand and reduce the
supply of pilots. The regional airline
world is a race to the bottom in terms of costs. The major air carriers are constantly playing
one carrier against the other to reduce costs.
Here is an example where Delta is currently forcing Pinnacle to demand
more concessions from their pilots. Delta forces Pinnacle cuts. Additionally, when the
supply of pilots was limited during the RJ boom, carriers were taking pilots at
250 hours. RJ Boom 1999. My opinion
is that 250 hours is not enough time for right seat regional operations.
The Flight 3407 families
fought hard for this legislation. They
recognized the problems with the regional airline industry in terms of pilot
training and protections from the corporate race to the bottom. This legislation is not perfect but it will help
redefine the rules and provide for a safer regional industry.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
I thought cabotage was a vegetable ?
This weeks source article is How Can We Complete? by Molly Martin, Air Line Pilot, August 2012
Out of the seven recommendations to ALPA pilots, the author wants to prevent changes to foreign ownership control and foreign cabotage restrictions.
The main reason I can come up with is that American Airlines is in the process of reorganizing its business. Oneworld partner British Airways is looking to invest in American to strengthen their alliance. Yahoo! News BA to invest in AA. Other recent foreign ownership transactions include Lufthansa's purchase of 20% of Jetblue Lufthansa and JetBlue and the questions surrounding the Virgin America ownership. Virgin America Second Approval.
Why is this an issue? Foreign ownership of US airlines is limited to 25%. 49 USC § 40102 Definitions. The reason for this strict requirement can be traced back to beginning, with aviation being a source of national pride. More practical explanations lay with the US air carrier fleet being available for military transport. Civil Reserve Fleet. The hypothetical question is how would a US air carrier, controlled by a foreign corporation or holding company, transport troops in a conflict with that country?
There are numerous foreign ownership concerns for the air carriers and their unions. Foreign companies play by the financial rules of their country. The control of capital, taxes and insurance must remain in balance for a fair and competitive environment. This control is cannot be maintained if carriers get to play by a different rule book because of their base country.
Foreign ownership controls dovetail with cabotage. Cabotage is air traffic within a country being flown by an air carrier of another county. US DOT definition. In 1944 at the Chicago Convention, the international community set up the Freedoms of the Air to help define commerce rules. There are nine freedoms that countries use. Boeing put together an easy to understand description of the freedoms.
Most nations accept First and Second Freedoms which are the right to overfly another's airspace and the ability to make a technical stop. An example of this was in June, 2005 a Northwest DC-10 diverted to Tehran, Iran after the crew was alerted to a possible cargo fire. They were the first US carrier to land in Iran in 26 years. They landed, resolved the alarm and continued to Amsterdam.
Third and Fourth Freedoms are traditional international travel arrangement. An example is Air Canada carrying revenue passengers between Toronto and New York.
The Freedoms get more liberal as they continue. The main concerns for the air carriers and unions is with the Eighth and Ninth Freedoms. This allows foreign air carriers to carry revenue passengers within the US. This is presently not allowed because it could give foreign air carriers an unfair advantage.
There is pressure from foreign air carriers for the US to liberalize both foreign ownership rules and Freedom rights. As the world and its markets become more global expect this pressure to increase.
Out of the seven recommendations to ALPA pilots, the author wants to prevent changes to foreign ownership control and foreign cabotage restrictions.
The main reason I can come up with is that American Airlines is in the process of reorganizing its business. Oneworld partner British Airways is looking to invest in American to strengthen their alliance. Yahoo! News BA to invest in AA. Other recent foreign ownership transactions include Lufthansa's purchase of 20% of Jetblue Lufthansa and JetBlue and the questions surrounding the Virgin America ownership. Virgin America Second Approval.
Why is this an issue? Foreign ownership of US airlines is limited to 25%. 49 USC § 40102 Definitions. The reason for this strict requirement can be traced back to beginning, with aviation being a source of national pride. More practical explanations lay with the US air carrier fleet being available for military transport. Civil Reserve Fleet. The hypothetical question is how would a US air carrier, controlled by a foreign corporation or holding company, transport troops in a conflict with that country?
There are numerous foreign ownership concerns for the air carriers and their unions. Foreign companies play by the financial rules of their country. The control of capital, taxes and insurance must remain in balance for a fair and competitive environment. This control is cannot be maintained if carriers get to play by a different rule book because of their base country.
Foreign ownership controls dovetail with cabotage. Cabotage is air traffic within a country being flown by an air carrier of another county. US DOT definition. In 1944 at the Chicago Convention, the international community set up the Freedoms of the Air to help define commerce rules. There are nine freedoms that countries use. Boeing put together an easy to understand description of the freedoms.
Most nations accept First and Second Freedoms which are the right to overfly another's airspace and the ability to make a technical stop. An example of this was in June, 2005 a Northwest DC-10 diverted to Tehran, Iran after the crew was alerted to a possible cargo fire. They were the first US carrier to land in Iran in 26 years. They landed, resolved the alarm and continued to Amsterdam.
Third and Fourth Freedoms are traditional international travel arrangement. An example is Air Canada carrying revenue passengers between Toronto and New York.
The Freedoms get more liberal as they continue. The main concerns for the air carriers and unions is with the Eighth and Ninth Freedoms. This allows foreign air carriers to carry revenue passengers within the US. This is presently not allowed because it could give foreign air carriers an unfair advantage.
There is pressure from foreign air carriers for the US to liberalize both foreign ownership rules and Freedom rights. As the world and its markets become more global expect this pressure to increase.
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
The day the airplanes stopped flying
September 11: FAA Closure of US Airspace Video
The day that the airplanes stopped flying I was based in Roanoke, VA. It was about 45 minutes from the time the first tower was hit when the inbound diversions started. In another 45 minutes, our ramp was converted into a parking lot. The tails from UA (IAD), US (DCA/PHL/PIT) and DL (CVG/ATL) were stacked two to three deep. None of the flights had ROA in the itinerary. The passengers and crew members were notified of what happened by the CNN airport TV. After seeing the news, there was no chaos and demands for accommodations. The hundreds of passengers simply paired up, rented cars and headed home. Some were hundreds of miles from their destination. It did not matter, they came together and kept moving.
Wednesday, September 5, 2012
Introduction
I got into aviation through a part time job with Mesaba Airlines in Muskegon. It was January 1997, I was on the freezing cold ramp, loading bags, deicing and handling passengers. My first airplanes were the Fairchild-Metro, Dash-8 and the factory fresh SAAB-340's.
I spent 10 months in Muskegon before transferring to Aspen Co. Following Aspen, I received a manager assignment in Ely, MN, Sault Sainte Marie, MI, Roanoke, VA and finally Detroit, MI. I have been in Detroit for the past 10 years. While in Detroit, I have worked in the above and below wing operations, hub control center and administration. In 2009, Delta merged the ground operation groups from Mesaba, Comair and Compass into Regional Elite Airline Services. This changed my focus from working for an airline to working for a contract ground handler. There is a definite change between working for an airline and working for a contract ground handler.
I am at a point in my career where I need a degree to get to the next level. I could move to a position at mainline Delta or possibly another carrier. My career focus is in the areas of training and education as well as safety, security and compliance.
I am interested in NextGen and the changes it will make to the industry. NextGen was a paper topic that I picked out the of the blue. Through completing that paper, I found my interest in NextGen.
I am also interested in the state of the industry. It is premature to say that the 50 seat RJ is dead but it's role is being diminished. Delta is upguageing the 50 seaters with 76 seaters and 717's. Will the other carriers follow? What does this mean for the industry?
I spent 10 months in Muskegon before transferring to Aspen Co. Following Aspen, I received a manager assignment in Ely, MN, Sault Sainte Marie, MI, Roanoke, VA and finally Detroit, MI. I have been in Detroit for the past 10 years. While in Detroit, I have worked in the above and below wing operations, hub control center and administration. In 2009, Delta merged the ground operation groups from Mesaba, Comair and Compass into Regional Elite Airline Services. This changed my focus from working for an airline to working for a contract ground handler. There is a definite change between working for an airline and working for a contract ground handler.
I am at a point in my career where I need a degree to get to the next level. I could move to a position at mainline Delta or possibly another carrier. My career focus is in the areas of training and education as well as safety, security and compliance.
I am interested in NextGen and the changes it will make to the industry. NextGen was a paper topic that I picked out the of the blue. Through completing that paper, I found my interest in NextGen.
I am also interested in the state of the industry. It is premature to say that the 50 seat RJ is dead but it's role is being diminished. Delta is upguageing the 50 seaters with 76 seaters and 717's. Will the other carriers follow? What does this mean for the industry?
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